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Chapter 
Shop-floor bargaining and the struggle for job control in the 
British automobile and aerospace industries 1950—1982 
 
Introduction 
In the UK automobile and aerospace industries, the struggle over job control and 
rewards for labour expended in the production process was particularly intense in the 
period of steady economic growth, high and stable employment, and low inflation, 
following the Second World War. This struggle reached its zenith during a phase of 
increasing output in the 1950s and early 1960s. By the late 1960s, however, as wages 
and unemployment began to rise and the rate of growth slowed there was a discernible 
shift in management industrial relations strategy and efforts by government to curb 
the authority and influence of shop-stewards. Despite disparities both between and 
within these respective industries, particularly the higher skill levels required by the 
aerospace sector, common experiences of the transformation of labour conditions of 
work are noticeable. In mapping some key historical struggles of automobile and 
aerospace workers against management forms of authority and control, it should be 
possible to distinguish the critical dynamics prevalent in both industries. Knowledge 
of the trajectory of labour relations and the pattern and character of conflict is critical 
to understanding and accounting for continuity and change in the social relations of 
production.  
 
What interests us here is the differing form and content of the antagonistic 
relationship between capital and labour at particular times in order to enhance our 
understanding of specific processes of change.  These are necessarily bounded by 
prevailing geographical, social, economic, and political climatic factors as well as 
industry specific characteristics, such as skill levels; the latter impacting on unions’ 
ability to hold some leverage over the regulation of labour supply. Although much has 
been written on industrial relations in the UK motor industry, to shed more light on 
the dynamics of shop-floor bargaining between 1950 and 1982 comparisons are made 
with experiences in the aerospace industry, which has received little academic 
attention. This chapter, therefore, seeks to highlight the similarities and differences in 
these two industries in the shift from the predominance of piecework in the post-war 
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period - characterised by the growth of shop-floor organisation that strengthened 
workers’ bargaining position over piece-rates ensuring mutuality was real rather than 
theoretical - to a regime of direct control as witnessed by the implementation of 
measured day work (MDW). Moreover, while this period in general terms can be 
characterised in two phases (from mutuality to increasing managerial control) this 
trajectory was uneven and by no means unambiguous. Even with the introduction of 
MDW across the sectors worker resistance was still evident. 
 
The critical issues here are to link the various phases of the tensions, conflicts and 
accommodations over the capital-labour relationship in two emblematic sectors – one 
characterised by British-owned motor companies’ pursuit of Fordist ideals1 and the 
other characterised by high skill and heavy reliance on the state in financing research 
and development and in awarding government contracts for aircraft and weapons for 
Britain’s military.2   While all these issues cannot be covered in full here this chapter 
attempts to begin to highlight the contours of change, stressing the divergent as well 
as the related experiences between the two industries. 
 
Informality and localism: regulation and control on the shop-floor 
 
By the late 1950s there emerged two principle characteristics, informality and 
localism, in the automobile and aerospace industries that, in combination, came to 
determine management-labour relations throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s. 
The effect of this development of informality and localism, bargaining processes that 
had broken free of the formal industry-wide negotiating arrangements, was to weaken 
the influence of and central role played by the trade unions’ national organisations. 
Moreover, this development could be seen to occur not just at plant level but also 
inside the plants themselves.3 Since shop stewards depended upon area support within 
a particular plant improving the remuneration and situation of workers in a specific 
area often led to individual stewards holding differing attitudes which at times placed 
them at odds with leading shop stewards.4  This was particularly the case in the motor 
industry and led to considerable conflict over wage levels both within and between 
plants and across companies, where national agreements were either ignored or seen 
to be ineffectual in their implementation.  Localism was also apparent in the 
aerospace industry: 
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The workers in the aircraft industry have built up a good trade union organisation which 
produces useful shop-floor representation on questions of wages, work allocation, labour load 
etc. 
 
To the extent that 
[T]he management have to consult and co-operate with the shop-floor workers in order to 
maintain production. 5 
 
The result of informality and localism was that for all intents and purposes the 
management of discontent was appropriated from national union officialdom, which 
is reflected in the increase in unofficial strikes in both the automobile and aerospace 
industries. 
 
 The Labour government that came to power in 1964 set its store in modernising 
British industry. Part of this process included the attempt to improve industrial 
relations. Concerned about the increase in unofficial strikes and restrictive practices, 
the government set up a Royal Commission under the direction of Lord Donovan to 
‘examine the relationships between management and employees, and the work of 
employers’ associations.’6 To better understand the causes of strikes in 
manufacturing, the Commission decided to examine the automobile industry in more 
depth because of its strike-proneness. As a result of this examination the Commission 
pronounced that: 
    
We attach more importance to the industry’s wage structure as a cause of strikes.  It is plain 
that employees’ actual earnings are not determined by the negotiations conducted at industry 
level….  Two major manufacturers (Ford and Vauxhall) are not in any case in the Engineering 
Employers’ Federation, which is one of the parties to such negotiations.  In the other 
remaining companies earnings are a long way in advance of the rates so settled at industry 
level, and a crucial part is therefore played by workplace negotiations.7  
 
That the workplace was the site of real industry negotiations reflected the strength of 
the power-base built by shop stewards and the readiness of workers to take industrial 
action in the favourable economic climate of the early 1960s.  As Donovan noted, this 
informal domain, where actual decision-making occurred, was inherently unstable, 
deriving from a highly competitive pattern of remuneration.  Yet this competitive 
facet of the employment relationship reinforced steward power within, and between, 
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plants and different companies.8  How was it possible for stewards to attain such a 
high degree of knowledge of the micro conditions of other plants not just within their 
own companies, but those of other firms as well?  This became possible as a result of 
the growth of what were known as ‘Combine Committees’ or ‘parallel unionism’.9 
These materialised in the automobile industry in the post war era as organised labour 
was much strengthened by the war-time accommodation between trade unions and 
government. In the aircraft industry these first emerged as a tour de force in 1935 
when union activists formed the Aircraft Shop Stewards National Council to co-
ordinate solidarity work.10 Combine committees were effectively an unrecognised 
system of union organisation running parallel to the recognised one as defined by the 
Donovan Commission.  Despite being frowned upon by trade union centres, the 
emergence of these shop-floor networks (the Combine committees) between shop 
stewards in different plants allowed stewards to get to grips with the minutiae of the 
industry, probably making them better informed, and usually more articulate about 
processes, than plant management. 
 
While a sector combine committee was stymied in the automobile industry, they 
nevertheless flourished for a considerable period within companies, despite the 
downturn in the economy that began in the late 1960s and continued throughout most 
of the 1970s. In aerospace, combine committees continued to thrive both within and 
across manufacturing plants and companies throughout the period. For instance at 
Bristol Aircraft Corporation (BAC) Guided Weapons division in the late 1960s the 
plant’s Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (EEPTU) 
shop steward recalled ‘we had our own shop stewards committee with the fitters, the 
coppersmiths and the transport and general, which was about 18 stewards at 
Dynamics [BAC Guided Weapons].’11 Eventually, in the early 1970s, BAC Guided 
Weapons set up their own shop stewards committee: ‘so we had a few disputes and 
sit-ins and we ended up with our own autonomy where we negotiated for Dynamics 
[BAC Guided Weapons] and they negotiated for the rest of aerospace, although we 
did work closely together.’12 
 
In the post war period it was axiomatic that whoever ‘called’ local agreements 
determined local power.13 In this situation while industry wide agreements existed 
they were only ever as good as the local industrial relations environments in which 
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they were introduced. A well-organised plant could, and often did, secure significant 
advances on national agreements.14 Piecework, which served employers so well in the 
inter-war years, when trade union organisation was weak, provided shop stewards in 
the post-war years with the means to bargain effectively. In the post-war boom, union 
membership increased and shop stewards were able to take advantage of the drive for 
increased production, and a tight labour market, to demand higher piece-rates 
knowing that employers were under pressure to keep their plants running for fear of 
losing business to their rivals.     
 
This was the view of the Donovan Commission, which famously attributed the 
absence of national level control over workplace institutions as the prime cause for 
the inchoate nature of industrial relations in the auto industry and elsewhere.15  The 
consequent fragmentation of bargaining which allowed, in the view of the 
Commission, undue scope for local determination of, inter alia, pay and conditions, 
was the principal reason for the high level of disputes over pay related issues.16  Yet 
informality was crucial for managers who needed to resolve local difficulties speedily, 
and crucial for stewards who needed to hold the line against management in defence 
of the ‘gang’, or work group in their shop-floor area.17  The Donovan Commission 
lamented the demise in the influence of full-time union officials: 
 
There is no doubt in our view, that the unions have not had sufficient influence on the 
workplace situation.  There are a number of reasons for this, one of which is the readiness of 
management to deal directly with shop stewards to the exclusion of full-time officials.18 
 
With the growing importance of local bargaining the ambiguity of the informal 
system emerged. On the one hand, the establishment of local bargaining units 
provided shop stewards with the mechanism to resist or challenge managerial 
authority. This enabled them to take advantage, in those plants that operated 
piecework payment systems, to negotiate increases in the wages of pieceworkers.  
This resulted in rapidly increasing wages and wage drift.  
 
On the other hand, the ability to generalise this local power along national lines 
proved largely elusive. For instance, at this time unions in the Coventry car industry 
‘appear not to have developed a company or even plant wide view of industrial 
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relations’.19 Stewards, however, had to prove themselves by providing leadership and 
addressing the concerns of their members. This was not easy. For example, in 1951, at 
the Rolls-Royce aero-engine plant in Hillington, Glasgow, shop stewards complained 
that their members frequently took unauthorised action to bring about a resolution of 
their grievances, which stewards seemed powerless to prevent. Department identities 
undermined the stewards’ efforts to pursue factory-wide negotiations.20 Thus localism 
in union-management orientation inevitably recreated, at the same time as it 
reinforced, local steward propensity to settle things at source. Inevitably this allowed 
for competitive wage bargaining, whatever the other disadvantages, labour could be a 
relatively powerful player.  Given that it was the wage and remuneration system 
which encouraged this process, the following sections looks at some examples to shed 
some light on its workings. 
 
Aerospace Industry: piecework to measured day work (MDW) 
 
A pieceworker’s pay, wholly or in part, is directly linked to work measurement, the 
time taken to produce work of the appropriate quality. In the aerospace industry of the 
1960s and 1970s, in essence the pieceworker’s wage comprised a basic rate that 
varied with skill and an incentive bonus that was usually premised on a standard time 
allowance to complete a specific job and applied to individuals or groups (gangs) of 
workers. By contrast, measured day work (MDW) is a payment system that provides a 
regular weekly wage, negotiated between management and the appropriate union, for 
which workers are expected to meet standard times for each job set by work study 
engineers.21 In the 1950s and 1960s, a period of tight labour markets in engineering, 
aircraft workers exerted increasing upward pressure on piece rates. Managerial 
control over piecework systems weakened as workers combined to resist the 
imposition of demanding time values by rate-fixers. The rate-fixers determined the 
level of effort required to produce a new or altered job. Ostensibly, piecework wage 
determination involved a process of continuous bargaining between the rate-fixer and 
the operator. But ‘custom and practice’ demanded that once set piece rates could not 
be altered unless changes occurred in the product or productive method. Defence 
against rate cutting depended on union strength at the workplace. Organized 
resistance from gang workers to ‘adjust’ the effort bargain often occurred if piece 
rates were deemed to be unfair. Shop stewards, however, were frequently called upon 
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to act on their members’ behalf in respect to individual piecework bargains, a time-
consuming process, which gave reason for some shop stewards to favour time-work 
over piecework.22 However, one Rolls-Royce (Coventry) convenor representing 
aircraft workers argued that in well-organized union shop piecework could lead to 
higher earnings and give workers greater control over the labour process, as the 
operator had direct control over the pace of production. Moreover: 
 
The continual battle over rates makes the workers very militant, for when the rate-fixer comes 
out to argue with you, you’re immediately faced with the basic element of class struggle: 
exploitation, potential or actual. 23 
 
On the deficit side, piecework could generate inequities and weaken shop-floor 
solidarity based on egalitarian principles.24 As reported at one Rolls-Royce 
negotiating committee meeting ‘members come into piecework areas and can’t get 
into the “brotherhood” ’ 25 which resulted in pay inequality. And differentials 
between operators on piecework could be substantial; often the cause of much tension
among workers because some earned substantially more than others. A retired B
Aircraft Corporation (BAC) convenor observed: 
 
ritish 
 
I mean say the average was one hundred pounds with shop average, I mean you’d get guys on 
one hundred and forty, one hundred and fifty pounds.26 
 
This convenor recalled how rate-fixing disputes were continuous. Rate fixers were 
described as some ‘of the most obnoxious people you could ever come across’. A 
retired shop floor worker in the same company likened rate-fixers with the 
‘Gestapo’.27 If workers were the least bit timid, some rate-fixers would try to take 
advantage and cut the rate, and in so doing bring down the shop average. This was 
important to all concerned because when a job value was in dispute, which was an 
everyday occurrence, affected workers were paid the average earnings of the shop. So 
the shop steward’s role was to contest those rate-fixer values that fell below that 
deemed to be fair. The BAC Convenor recalled that on those occasions he would take 
the case to the senior rate-fixer and either reach a compromise or place the job in 
dispute. Once in dispute operators, under the national engineering agreement, had to 
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be given another job until the dispute was resolved. Non-compliance with this 
agreement resulted in a stoppage of work by the gang or section affected.28  
 
 These types of disputes were common across the aerospace industry and in some 
plants were incessant. For instance, at Rolls-Royce Bristol engine plant the frequency 
of disputes was of serious concern to the company. In 1970, Rolls-Royce management 
protested: ‘We cannot allow the “argy bargy” of the existing system to carry on where 
there are daily argument[s] in every detail”.29 
 
The following year, 4 February 1971, the company was forced into receivership. The 
Conservative government baled out the company by taking it into State ownership 
with the intention of turning the company around and returning it to the private sector. 
Nationalisation was not the policy of a Conservative government. State ownership did 
not bring with it a resolution to labour relations problems. Disputes over piece-rates 
continued reaching crisis proportions again in 1974. Increasingly concerned by this 
state of affairs on 29 January 1975, R. Whitfield, Managing Director of Rolls-Royce, 
wrote to union representatives: 
 
I regret that in 1974 we continued to suffer industrial disputes, each with its own deadly effect 
on our performance. We have not been free from some form of industrial action on any 
working day since I was appointed your Managing Director. The vast majority of these 
industrial disputes involved manual employees at Bristol. It is vitally important for our future 
that a new wage structure should be agreed for the Bristol factories – one which is felt to be 
fair, which achieves constructive relationships and working practices and which drastically 
reduces the amount of industrial action we have suffered.30 
 
Although Bristol was opposed to MDW most other plants in the Rolls-Royce 
Combine Committee had accepted its introduction and Bristol workers found that as a 
result their wages, relative to other Rolls-Royce workers in the UK, were falling 
behind. Moreover, the company was preparing the ground for the introduction of 
MDW without union involvement. Thus the decision was taken ‘to take the bull by 
the horns and get involved in the new scheme.’ After lengthy negotiations in the 
spring of 1975 an agreement was reached on a Bristol wage structure that included the 
replacement of piecework, which directly affected around one sixth of the workforce, 
with MDW. The new structure comprised six grades of labour with wages ranging 
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from £40 per week on the lowest grade to £57 on the highest. This lifted Bristol 
workers back into second place in the wages league behind Coventry.31 
 
Around the same time, just before nationalisation of the industry in 1977, an 
agreement was reached between the engineering unions and management at BAC 
Guided Weapons in Bristol to abolish piecework. The strong bargaining position of 
labour on the shop-floor had resulted in wage drift. This was in part a consequence of 
the rise in ‘non-negotiated’ shop-floor wages, primarily fragmented piecework 
bargaining.32 As the plant’s retired EETPU convenor put it: ‘I think the Company had 
a problem…because the shop-floor wages were escalating out of control 
really…quality control, the clerical people…the planners and engineers, really were 
being placed relative to the shop-floor’, whose wages were the highest.33  
 
The carrot offered by BAC, to unions and their members, to replace piecework with 
MDW was full sick pay; increased holidays; improved pension scheme; guaranteed 
regular and predictable earnings; and the discontinuance of the weekly confrontation 
with the rate-fixer.34 Ostensibly, control over the pace of production shifted from 
mutuality between the rate-fixer and the operator to the foreman. In reality workers 
were still able to assert some informal control by working at the same pace as before 
(under the piecework system). Knowledge of production was still to a certain degree 
in workers’ hands and thus foremen were not always able to fully assert their 
authority. The retired BAC convenor explained: 
 
Well they put it [control] back to the foremen, but I don’t think the foremen or really the 
system was adequate. I mean people were so used to working in a certain way by that time 
that the supervisor would give you a job and the job ensured that you were really working and 
that was it.35 
 
Nonetheless, the replacement of piecework with MDW was a qualitative change in 
‘that by separating negotiations over pay and work, change can be introduced with 
less resistance’.36 This, together with collapse of the post-war consensus; rising 
unemployment; nationalisation of BAC in 1977, re-privatisation in 1979; and the 
emergence of Thatcherism raised the stakes and put increased pressure on shop 
stewards and convenors. At the once state owned British Aerospace (BAe): 
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The collective strength of the shop-floor unions was now central to the bargaining machinery 
and more effectively controlled the rate of exploitation than the traditional control battles 
between the individual rate fixer and individual operator.37 
 
At Westland Helicopters, in 1975, management abolished piecework by decree. This 
provocative action was met by a strike on 16 May which lasted several weeks. On 23 
June, a back-to-work agreement was reached that, except for the pension scheme, 
secured staff conditions for manual workers, including a new sick pay scheme, and an 
ex gratia payment of £50 to skilled employees and pro rata payments to other grades 
in exchange for withdrawing resistance to the introduction of MDW.38  
 
At Rolls-Royce, company strategy to eliminate piecework was first initiated in 1968. 
It took a decade to achieve, and the end was bitter. In 1978, a small pocket of workers 
employed at Parkside, Coventry, was still paid by the piece. Thus, the elimination of 
piecework for these remaining 330 manual workers still paid by that system was, in 
the company’s eyes, critical as the Rolls-Royce workforce looked to these 
pieceworkers ‘as the pace-setters for the whole pay structure’.39 In early April 1978, 
2,600 manual workers were suspended without pay after refusing to work ‘normally’ 
following the breakdown of pay negotiations. The company demanded that an 
agreement over the elimination of piecework for the remaining 330 manual workers 
must be part of any wage settlement. The union insisted that the two issues (wage 
claim and the elimination of piecework) be dealt with independently citing that: 
‘every other section of Rolls-Royce Ltd throughout the country has been paid the 10% 
in full’ (Higgs, 1978).40 Union members started a work-in. The Company cut off the 
power, so the workers occupied the plant. The occupation lasted four weeks before a 
settlement was reached that included shop stewards acceding to the elimination of 
piecework ‘provided that they [members] do not lose money from the change over’.41 
 
Thus, by the late 1970s, piecework had been vanquished and MDW well established. 
Yet, despite the establishment of MDW control over the pace of production was still 
contested. For instance, the launching of the Roll-Royce Bristol Survival Plan in 1982 
revealed that restrictive practices were still evident in the company despite the 
introduction of MDW.  This plan set out the problems faced by the organisation, 
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objectives and scope, and a detailed point by point diagnosis of the effect of 
restrictive work practices. A remedy or a requirement crowned each point. The 
problem: 
 
? Excessively high indirect-to direct support in all departments; 
? Low overall productivity; 
? Poor response to Engineering and Manufacturing Programmes; 
? An atmosphere of conflict and narrow-mindedness between groups.42  
 
Two examples (from 59) of changes required in working practices are suffice to 
reveal that the implementation of MDW at Rolls-Royce may have enhanced 
managerial control but it did not eliminate all forms of shop-floor control and 
resistance: 
Bristol Survival Plan (1982) 
Standby Agreements and other Established Working Practices 
Items for Review 
 
 SUBJECT AREAS 
AFFECTED 
CURRENT EFFECT MANAGEMENT 
REQUIREMENT 
48 Toolroom: 
recognition of 
estimated time 
standards 
No. 2 Toolroom Refusal to recognise and work 
estimates times for jobs and to 
permit monitoring of work to 
these estimates results in: 
- high tool costs due to 
excessive time taken. 
- inability to investigate causes 
of excess time and hence to 
eliminate problems faced by 
the toolmaker. 
- Difficulties in performance 
and cost monitoring 
Toolmaker should 
be accountable for 
work produced 
and time taken 
49 Tool manufacture: 
restriction applied 
to 
Planner/Estimator 
No. 2 Toolroom Refusal to allow 
Planner/Estimator on the shop-
floor to discuss job requirements 
causes loading of foreman with 
excessive duties that need not 
involve him 
Planner/Estimator 
to discuss job 
requirement with 
Toolmaker 
 
Clearly, despite the universality of MDW in the early 1980s, at Roll-Royce job times 
were not always recognised and work-study did not have the run of the factory. 
 
The automobile industry: piecework to measured day work 
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It is important to note that employers adopted piecework to stimulate greater 
productive effort from their workforce. In many instances, especially where organised 
labour was weak, workers’ experience of piecework was one of self-exploitation as 
they strove to produce more and more in order to achieve a living wage. The strength 
of piecework in the post-war boom, however, was that ‘negotiations for increases can 
take place on the time for the job whenever a change takes place in the means, method 
or material involved.’43 Eschewing central bargaining arrangements and establishing 
the dominance of local pay bargaining and job regulation were particularly apparent 
in the motor industry. The Donovan report was especially concerned to remedy the 
disorder resulting from conflict between formal and informal systems of industrial 
relations. 
 
 At Morris Motors Ltd., Cowley, for instance, the Council found that in 1965, 256 out of 297 
stoppages of work had occurred before the senior shop steward had even a chance to put the 
grievance into procedure. In the first half of 1966, again 128 stoppages out of 142 took place 
before the senior shop steward had time to act on them... 44 
 
In effect the Donovan report saw part of the solution resting on the introduction of 
factory-wide MDW agreements. 45  The most bitterly fought struggle against the 
introduction of MDW took place at British-Leyland’s Cowley plant in Oxford. 
Thus, despite many ready examples we have taken this plant as an exemplar of this 
invariant relationship across the sector in Britain.   
 
The history of the Cowley plant (or complex of plants as it was) is an instructive one.  
For our purposes we focus upon the reason and consequence of the introduction of 
MDW in 1971 (although, it did not achieve complete coverage in the British Leyland 
–BL- until 1975 with nationalisation).  Why was the ‘piece-rate system’ the defining 
social and political face of industrial relations both at BL and across the automobile 
industry?  And why was its successor, MDW, so central to management between the 
1970s to the late 1980s?   
 
By the mid 1960s, the pay of seventy-two per cent of the Cowley workforce was 
either directly or indirectly based on piecework payment systems.46 The number of 
shop stewards had increased by 280 per cent between 1959 and 1966.47 Originally 
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piecework, when it was introduced in the 1920s, had been an effective tool of 
management control in an era of weak trade union organisation.  This was the case 
until the 1950s by which time unions had achieved a strong workplace presence, 
represented by determined shop stewards, and ‘control’, or at least a significant 
degree of regulation of the piecework system: 
 
[Management] rightly … saw piecework as one of the pillars of the shop steward movement in 
the car industry and they knew that to attack it was to attack the shop stewards. 
Our stance [the union, the TGWU, at plant level] was the outright defence of the piecework 
system despite the fact that the piecework system was originally brought in by [the owner] 
when his plants were non-union as the most effective way to maximise profitably.48  
 
However, Hyman and Elger in recalling this period argued that one should be cautious 
‘against over-romantic conceptions of the efficacy of workers’ job 
controls...Frequently they operated within limits acceptable to employers’.49 For 
example piece-rate systems ‘cushioned the company [BMC, Cowley] against 
production losses, for the basic principle of “no work, no pay” meant that workers, 
rather than the company, bore the cost of “idle time” or “shut outs”.50 
 
Nonetheless, the description above is really an account of the balance of power in the 
plant at the level of the assembly track itself. The level of earnings of forty per cent of 
the workforce ‘was dependent not on their own production but on the earnings of 
piece-workers’ mainly employed on assembly.51 Thus, outcomes from the struggle 
over piecework rates and job controls during this period were fundamental to both the 
company and its employees. It is clear that by the mid 1960s the piece-rate system had 
led to the erosion of management control, declining productivity and wage drift.52 As 
elsewhere, the Morris management at Cowley, chose to ignore these developments as 
it was, along with other motor manufacturers, too preoccupied with output while 
demand for cars was buoyant in the 1950s and early 1960s.53 Managers of specific 
work areas were usually quite desperate to forge local deals with the stewards, who 
were recognised by management as the negotiators on behalf of workers in particular 
areas.  In the 1970s, however, as the market situation further deteriorated, a pattern of 
increasing management frustration with shop steward autonomy emerged.54  ‘Once 
management had lost control of the piecework system, they no longer wanted it, and 
sought to replace it by an alternative system…’ 55  
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 The alternative system, MDW, was forcibly introduced in December 1971after a long 
and bitter struggle. Cowley shop stewards did secure an important concession, 
however, in that mutual agreement had to be reached before the results of work study 
could be implemented. In the event of a failure to agree a temporary arrangement to 
maintain production involving ‘fair effort’ would operate until a final agreement was 
concluded.56 That shop stewards were able to secure a mutuality clause slowed the 
company’s capacity to reassert management control and obtain the full benefit of 
MDW. However, the company had secured a platform enabling it to move towards 
intensifying the work effort and reducing comparative wage levels.57   
 
The idea behind MDW58 was to attempt to centralise decision making, first at the 
factory level and then at the level of the firm.  This was why at Cowley, and at BL’s 
other sites, although with varying degrees of conflict, the unions opposed the 
introduction of MDW.  MDW was a means by which management could set wage 
rates at plant level and later, company level. 
 
The centralising drive behind MDW also goes some way towards accounting for the 
fact that the union centres (outside the plants and nationally) were lukewarm in 
opposition.  Negotiations and decisions on remuneration would be completely taken 
out of the plants and out of the hands of the shop stewards.  At Cowley, after a six-
week strike in 1970, the workforce was forced to accept MDW on the new Marina-
model assembly line but without agreement from the local union branch. However, 
the company was unable to achieve the productivity increases that it required because 
Cowley workers refused to strike an agreement to allow work study experts on to the 
production line. The company attempted to force the issue but this prompted a walk-
out. Acknowledging the unfavourable climate management decided to bide its time 
and conceded the principle of mutuality, and an agreement with the unions was 
struck.59  This agreement re-introduced an element of in situ control by the stewards.  
Basically ‘mutuality’ meant that any change to the line speed had to be negotiated 
with the shop steward in his or her particular area. The ‘mutuality’ agreement was 
management’s concession to get MDW through.  Nevertheless, while the ‘mutuality’ 
deal returned a significant element of steward negotiating power the beginning of the 
end for shop-floor autonomy had been signalled with the introduction of MDW.   
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 In 1974, the company attempted to circumvent the mutuality agreement by imposing 
new schedules on the Marina line without union agreement. A full-scale stoppage in 
April followed. A letter was sent by the plant director to striking workers demanding 
that they work the Marina line under new conditions without union agreement: 
 
...report for work, tell your foreman you will give your assignment a fair effort at a line-speed 
of 30 per hour. To those who refuse, I must ask the question – do you wish to remain in our 
employment? If you won’t work we must assume you wish to leave us and we will respond 
accordingly.60  
 
 Three days after this letter was sent the workers voted to accept the company’s terms 
and return to work. ‘Management opened the plant the following day and the 
industrial engineers commenced their studies on their own terms.’61 The company 
finally accomplished what it had set out to do in 1971.     
 
The period after this was marked by the corporatist engagement between the unions 
and the Labour government and the establishment of the National Enterprise Board 
(NEB) — a vehicle for holding controlling stakes in manufacturing firms ‘as a way of 
injecting public money into private companies, and exercising some control over the 
use of the funds, while encouraging competition’.62 This Government control was 
exercised to encourage company restructuring and rationalisation, as British Leyland 
workers experienced after the NEB took over the company helm in 1975.  This is 
crucial for making sense of the historical import of MDW.  The automotive industry 
was but one of a number of sectors where the labour government and official unions 
struggled to contain shop-floor power.  While often exaggerated, on sporadic 
occasions this local strength, nonetheless, significantly undermined national trade 
union and labour government industrial and economic strategy.  The introduction of 
MDW (1970-1973) at British Leyland Motor Company (BLMC), followed by the 
formation in 1975 of British Leyland under State control, may have cleared the way 
for the Company to bring about the centralisation of bargaining on remuneration and 
other conditions ‘but it was to prove a long-drawn-out and conflict-prone 
operation’.63  This was both cause and effect of the diminution of shop steward 
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power, a long sought goal of both trade unions outside both plant and firm, and of 
government, as codified in the Donovan Commission from as early as 1965-1968. 
 
This diminution of shop steward power was reflected in the unions’ acceptance of the 
Ryder plan which included the approval of the executive ‘right to manage’ without 
union interference and endorsement of a worker participation scheme. Leading 
Communist Party convenors, Derek Robinson, Peter Nicholas and Tom Steward gave 
credence to the scheme by enthusiastically taking up places on the BL Cars Council. 
Together with other council members, and union national secretaries Jack Jones 
(TGWU) and Hugh Scanlon (AUEW), they supported a strategy of company survival 
at all costs even though this meant accepting redundancies, plant closures and 
opposing strikes.64 Senior stewards became ‘dangerously detached from their 
membership’.65 Their actions, however unwittingly, paved the way for the 
appointment of Michael Edwardes as Chair of British Leyland (1977-1982) who was 
to preside over reducing the workforce by half, significantly intensifying the pace of 
production, cutting real wages and sacking leading shop stewards, including Derek 
Robinson. 
 
Edwardes, by jettisoning recent commitments to worker participation, as defined by 
the Ryder plan, was able to break union solidarity on the basis that it had no 
alternative strategy.  As Edwardes himself put it, his aim was to ‘re-establish 
management authority’.66  According to him, the Ryder report reinforced bureaucratic 
decision making.  It would have to go.  It was, ‘a bureaucratic paper chase dissipating 
management resources and effort.  Some management decisions were delayed by 
months while the joint consultative machinery tried unsuccessfully to grind out a 
consensus.’67   
 
Edwardes’ hard line approach was signalled by his determination to tear up existing 
agreements and sweep away the remnants of mutuality.  His aim was essentially to 
destroy traditional job controls and rationalise production. Plant closures followed, 
first the Speke Triumph TR7 factory and then plants at Canley, Abingdon, Castle 
Bromwich, Liverpool and Park Royal in London. Edwardes’ final triumph came, in 
November 1981, when the T&GWU acceded to take international levels of 
competition as ‘the bench mark for all future negotiations on pay, conditions and 
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manning.’ Automotive workers across the globe were increasingly subjected to 
‘chasing each other’s effort under the watchful eye of bankers and managers intent 
only on the preservation of their profits and the capitalist system’ (Rudder, 1983: 
45).68 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the 1950s and 60s, informal localised bargaining came to characterise union-
management negotiations in both the automobile and aerospace industries. The 
importance of shop stewards directly representing their members in these industries, 
as indeed elsewhere in manufacturing, increased to the extent that this development 
became the subject of a major inquiry, the Donovan Commission. By the time the 
Donovan report was published, however, the intensification of international 
competition had already compelled car producers to put in place plans to reassert 
management authority; piecework was to be eliminated and replaced by MDW. The 
ending of piecework was strenuously opposed and took over a decade to achieve. 
Only management concessions such as ex gratia payments and the shift to 
harmonisation in the conditions of employment in aerospace and mutuality in 
automobiles, in conjunction with an increasingly hostile economic climate, cleared the 
way for employers to establish MDW. This major reform was buttressed by State 
intervention, particularly in the automobile industry. By taking control of British 
Leyland the State set in train an extensive restructuring and rationalisation programme 
in the context of increasing international competition and a history of low capital 
investment. That this was undertaken under a Labour administration served to 
heighten expectations among union leaders and most, but not all, leading shop 
stewards that this was to be the salvation for the company and indeed the British car 
industry. Instead it opened the door for Edwardes, on his appointment as Chair of 
British Leyland, to carry out a further rationalisation of the company and reassert 
managerial authority. 
 
The reassertion of managerial authority did not happen to the same degree in the 
aerospace industry. Unlike the car industry, aerospace, at least the military arm, had 
access to a captive market, the State. While this point should not be exaggerated, as 
increasingly during this period the industry became dependent on export-related 
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products, it should not be ignored (Lovering, 1986: 20).69 Another important 
difference between the industries, as highlighted in the introduction, is that aerospace 
products are not mass produced and require more highly skilled workers than the car 
industry. Therefore the influence of craft unions has been greater and employers’ 
dependence on skills more which has enabled stewards to sustain influence at the 
workplace to a greater extent than their counterparts in the car industry.   
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